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Coordination in temporary organizations: formal and informal 
mechanisms at the 2016 Olympics 
 
Abstract: 
Purpose – This paper explores intra-firm coordination in temporary organizations (TOs). 
Specifically, it identifies and explains how operational coordination evolves over time in a 
particular TO: the 2016 Olympic Games Organizing Committee. 
Design/methodology/approach – This is an immersive case study based on qualitative 
analysis and longitudinal fieldwork, which allowed the observation of operational coordination 
in real time. The main sources of data are participant observation, semi-structured interviews, 
and internal documents of the TO.  
Findings – Our findings suggest that operational coordination in TOs dealing with multiple 
and decentralized operations takes place through the combination of both formal and informal 
coordination mechanisms. Further analysis indicates a contingency logic in using these 
mechanisms, shaped by the presence of specific coordination challenges in different phases of 
work. Three main aspects influencing coordination are explored. Firstly, we suggest that TOs 
are inherently ‘hybrid’. That is, they comprise enduring as well as temporary and centralized 
as well as decentralized elements. These elements change over time. Secondly, we explore 
‘venueization’ – a formal transition phase between planning and operation in which centralized 
structural elements and processes are translated to operational units. Thirdly, since TOs present 
emergence and dynamism, and related challenges across various phases of work, we argue that 
coordination is contingent on the phase of the project.  
Research limitations/implications – Although we recognize that our findings are limited to 
the empirical context in analysis, we believe that this paper more broadly provides a 
generalizable basis for future research to explore the dynamic nature of operational 
coordination in TOs.  
Practical implications – Our findings can help practitioners understand and identify the 
challenges embedded in temporary contexts and develop coordination strategies accordingly.  
Originality/value – This study explains how operational coordination takes place in TOs 
enabled by formal and informal mechanisms, which are contingently combined over time 
through particular coordination strategies. 
Keywords: Temporary organizations; Operational coordination; Contingency Theory; Project 
management; Hybridity; 2016 Olympic Games. 
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The primary concern of the Operations Management (OM) discipline is the design of 
operations and supply networks that enable organizations to deliver products and services 
(Fisher, 1997; Slack et al., 2010). Since the early development of manufacturing strategy 
(Skinner, 1969), a critical task of the OM field has been to design processes according to the 
market requirements they are supposed to satisfy. For example, while Hayes and Wheelwright 
(1984) related the design of the process to the stage of the product life cycle, for Hill (1985), 
the ‘process choice’ was related to volume. In the popular treatment of process design in Slack 
et al. (2010), volume and variety determine the choice of technology, the design of jobs and 
the layout or flow of process stages, as well as aspects of planning and control. In many of 
these frameworks, ‘project’ is one of the basic process types, suited, like the job shop, to high 
variety and low volume activities. 
These approaches are based on an application of contingency theory (e.g. Galbraith, 1973), 
albeit that this foundation is often implicit rather than explicit (Sousa and Voss, 2008). 
Furthermore, as with the development of contingency theory in the general organisation studies 
literature, the emphasis in OM has been on the design of processes and supply chains rather 
than on examining how operations activities are carried out within these designs, i.e. how things 
actually get done at the operational level (Okhuysen and Bechky, 2009). In some specific 
contexts, including those of project management and software engineering, informal 
coordination within formal structures has been considered (e.g., Faraj and Sproull, 2000; 
Hanisch and Wald, 2014, Sydow et al., 2004). However, these tend to be exceptions. Overall, 
studies have tended to downplay the organisational means and human interactions that make 
coordination actually happen. More recently, however, OM researchers are increasingly 
turning their attention to informal operational coordination, across a wider range of process 
types. For example, Dobrzykowski and Tarafdar (2015) show that social interaction ties are an 
important complement to formal processes for information exchange in a healthcare setting; 
Sting and Loch (2016) demonstrate the importance of bottom-up ‘search’ processes in 
coordinating the implementation of multiple, inter-related strategies in large manufacturing 
companies; and Pagell et al. (2015) show that relational coordination allows the achievement 
of potentially contradictory demands of safety and operational effectiveness. 
In this paper, we combine a contingency perspective with this enhanced sensitivity to 
informal coordination, to examine temporary organizations (TOs) (Lundin and Söderholm, 
1995; Söderlund, 2004; Sydow et al., 2004), which have particular relevance to the project 
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context. TOs are time-limited organizational forms designed around a shared purpose, ranging 
from projects, conferences, sporting events, and legislative sessions through task forces, 
theatre, and election campaign organizations (e.g., Meyerson et al., 1995; Miles, 1977). These 
organizations present especially interesting challenges for the dominant ‘process-design-
oriented’ model of OM because they usually deal with novelty and uncertainty. While some 
approaches conceive of TOs as dealing primarily with low-volume and high-variety processes, 
others recognize that TOs exhibit different degrees of volume and variety (e.g. Maylor, 2010; 
Meredith and Mantel, 2008). For example, while some projects are relatively small and 
incremental in nature, taking place within the structures of an enduring organization, others are 
carried out by an organization that is established especially for the completion of a particular 
task, and is then disbanded. TOs are therefore temporary to differing degrees and in different 
ways. This arguably influences how activities are coordinated.  
Besides novelty and uncertainty, there are particular challenges to coordination in temporary 
contexts such as time pressure, high levels of interdependence, a need for rapid action, and on-
the-spot decision making (Bechky, 2006; Majchrzak et al., 2007; Sydow et al., 2004). For 
example, disaster response involves many interdependent tasks, a great number and variety of 
actors, and incomplete information in settings demanding urgent action (Kovács and Spens, 
2007; Van Wassenhove, 2006). As a result, decentralized decision-making and non-
standardized solutions emerge. Mega-events (such as the Olympics or the World Cup) are 
unique events for the host cities, huge and complex in nature, involve massive numbers of 
people, and occur in different localities, with very varied conditions. There are usually formal 
processes by which knowledge is transferred from one edition of the event to the next, but these 
can only capture very high-level and codifiable information. The organizations running them 
have a limited lifetime and usually lack the organizational memory to maintain more detailed 
knowledge (Currie and Shalaby, 2012; Minis and Tsamboulas, 2008). Construction projects 
present their own coordination problems due to their size, dispersed operations, and multiple 
and diverse actors (e.g., designers, subcontractors, and construction managers) (Jha and Iyer, 
2006). Operational coordination thus assumes a central role in these TOs. This is because they 
are driven by tasks and processes usually developed and executed by multiple teams and 
entities that are decentralized in some way, which need to work interdependently to accomplish 
their time-constrained activities.  
Although some scholars have addressed coordination problems in specific temporary 
contexts such as disaster relief operations, projects, and film sets (e.g. Bechky, 2006; Hanisch 
and Wald, 2014; Majchrzak et al., 2007), these studies assume that temporariness is a constant 
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and dominant feature of TOs, and explore coordination only during a specific period of time 
(usually in the operation phase).  Given that TOs usually have a number of different phases 
(e.g., mitigation, preparedness, response, and rehabilitation in disaster responses (Kovács and 
Spens, 2007; Van Wassenhove, 2006) and conception, planning, development, and evaluation 
in projects (Maylor, 2010; Meredith and Mantel, 2008)), which have different kinds of 
activities and processes, it is likely that they may require different coordination strategies for 
the different phases. This emphasizes the need to examine operational coordination over time.  
Further, TOs exist in a variety of unique and distinctive settings and present different and 
fluctuating degrees of temporariness. As such, further understanding of how coordination takes 
place in TOs is necessary. Therefore, we address the following research question: How does 
operational coordination take place through the various phases of work in temporary 
organizations? For this, we have investigated a particular temporary organization: the 2016 
Olympic Games Organizing Committee. Specifically, we have examined operational 
coordination through an immersive, real-time, longitudinal, and qualitative field study of this 
TO, immediately before and during the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro.  
The following two sections cover relevant literature on firm-level coordination and on TOs. 
Next, we describe the study’s methods and present its findings. Finally, we discuss the 
theoretical contributions, practical implications, and further research avenues. 
 
2. Firm-level operational coordination 
Coordination is defined as “integrating or linking together different parts of an organization to 
accomplish a collective set of tasks” (Van de Ven et al., 1976, p. 322). Research on 
coordination in OM, following the evolution of the field, has addressed a wide range of topics. 
These include ‘hard’ (e.g., industrial management methods, inventories, and process 
improvements) and ‘soft’ issues such as supply chain management and strategy (Neely, 1993; 
Pilkington and Meredith, 2009), at different levels of analysis (strategic, tactical, and 
operational), within and between organizations.  
This study focuses on intra-firm coordination at the operational level, that is, on 
coordination mechanisms that enable people to get operations done within the firm. According 
to Mintzberg (1989, p. 101), coordination mechanisms are “the most basic elements of 
structure” in organizations. They enable the completion of tasks and include formal and 
informal elements. Formal coordination mechanisms are implemented by managers and 
include plans, hierarchy, procedures, manuals, and routines, and are usually planned and 
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institutionalized throughout an organization. Informal coordination mechanisms are those that 
emerge from people on the ground, which are usually non-planned and non-institutionalized. 
They include creative solutions, mutual adjustments, social roles, and informal means of 
interaction (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967; Van de Ven et al., 1976). These 
mechanisms are used to enable coordination either through the design of tasks to reduce task 
interdependence, or through intensive communication among interdependent actors (Galbraith, 
1973). Srikanth and Puranam (2010), however, suggest a third alternative: tacit coordination, 
based on the existence of ‘common ground’ among interdependent actors. This form of 
coordination is particularly important in settings where intensive communication is difficult, 
for example, because of distance, but standardized rules and procedures are insufficient due to 
task uncertainty and time pressure. 
Coordination has been traditionally seen as design, which focuses on more planned and 
deterministic approaches. However, recent research has focussed increasingly on coordination 
as practice, examining how coordination takes place ‘on the ground’, enabled by coordination 
mechanisms (Okhuysen and Bechky, 2009). Therefore, these two aspects of the literature are 
reviewed.  
 
2.1 Coordination as design 
Traditional approaches to coordination focused on the design of formal mechanisms. The 
design of work and management systems through specialization, standardization, and 
rationalization was the basis of the classical management approach (Taylor, 1916; Fayol, 
1949). “This approach became marked by the notion that they were searching for ‘the one best 
way’” (Van de Ven et al., 2013). It has been especially instrumental in developing the ‘best 
practice’ paradigm in OM, which assumes that the adoption of best (world-class) practices 
leads to superior performance (Voss, 1995). The widespread adoption of management practices 
relating to total quality management and lean production illustrates this paradigm (Sousa and 
Voss, 2008). 
In the 1960s/1970s, organization design scholars, reacting to the notion of ‘one best way’ 
(Van de Ven et al., 2013), developed the idea of contingency design. Coordination was 
conceptualized as being influenced by characteristics such as uncertainty, interdependence, and 
size. Greater uncertainty and task interdependence, it was held, leads to more coordination 
through interpersonal coordination mechanisms such as informal communication or mutual 
adjustment, rather than through formal mechanisms such as standardization, hierarchies, and 
routines (Galbraith 1973; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967). As unit size 
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increases, there is greater use of impersonal coordination and hierarchy (Van de Ven et al., 
1976). Additionally, Burns and Stalker (1966) suggest that coordination is dependent upon the 
task nature (stable vs. changing), which in turn determines the organization design 
(bureaucratic vs. organic). These classic studies focused on the need to balance differentiation 
among organizational units, with integration achieved through coordination mechanisms.  
These ideas have broadly influenced research in the OM field. Sousa and Voss (2008) 
consider the seminal works of Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) and Thompson (1967) as the 
precursors of major OM approaches. In particular, operations strategy (Skinner, 1969; Hayes 
and Wheelwright, 1984) is to a large extent concerned with achieving a strategic fit between 
operations processes and infrastructure, and the demands of the business environment. The 
dominant OM process design approach typically is about a one-off evaluation of the fit between 
the process type and the market conditions. Studies in OM, although clearly adopting 
Contingency Theory (CT) assumptions, do not explicitly state it (Sousa and Voss, 2008).  
Revisiting CT in a contemporary context, Van de Ven et al. (2013) strongly encourage 
researchers to study the applicability of CT in studying rapidly changing operational systems. 
In particular, they focus on understanding variations in such systems in terms of: (1) design 
choice (centrally chosen, negotiated among stakeholders, or self-organizing); (2) control 
(planned or emergent); (3) formality (informal ad hoc or formal rational arrangements); (4) 
duration (short or long term); and (5) unit of analysis (internal or external, micro or macro) by 
(6) active or passive decision-makers. This study addresses this call by examining TOs, which 
present varying dynamics and coordination challenges throughout the various phases of work. 
 
2.2 Coordination as ‘practice’ 
In the 1990s, scholars increasingly conceptualized coordination as managing dependencies 
among activities, suggesting that different kinds of dependencies require specific coordination 
processes (e.g. Crowston, 1997; Malone et al., 1999). Recent approaches to coordination are 
“less concerned with optimizing structures for a given environment, and instead consider 
coordination as it happens, assuming that people in organizations must coordinate the work 
regardless of the organization design” (Okhuysen and Bechky, 2009, p. 469). For example, 
‘relational bureaucracy’  (Gittell, 2002; Gittell and Douglass, 2012) recognizes that, although 
coordination may be facilitated by certain design elements, it is more fundamentally a process 
of interaction among participants (Pagell et al., 2015). Another example is the emergent 
coordination approach. It suggests that collective outcomes are achieved through ongoing 
interactions and activities to manage uncertain inputs in the face of unpredictable demands 
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(e.g., Bechky and Chung, 2017; Majchrzak et al., 2007). This depends very often on 
professional workers exercising discretion to integrate complex tasks (Bechky and Chung, 
2017). Looking at a medical trauma centre, where fast-response and error-free tasks are vital, 
Faraj and Xiao (2006) found that coordination practices such as reliance on protocols, plug-
and-play teaming, and knowledge sharing are essential for the management and application of 
distributed expertise. 
These discussions of coordination as ‘practice’ focus on human agency and expertise, 
interactions, and emergent processes. There is a growing interest among OM researchers in this 
approach as scholars have begun to acknowledge the importance of ‘soft’ and emergent aspects 
of coordination, such as social roles and relationships (Dobrzykowski and Tarafdar, 2015; 
Sting and Loch, 2016; Pagell et al., 2015). This complements the dominant, design-based view, 
which seeks to fit process choice to task characteristics and environmental conditions, and 
typically focuses on coordination in relatively enduring and stable settings at a given period of 
time. “Traditional coordination theory emphasizes the how (i.e., the mode) of coordination as 
opposed to the what (content) and when (circumstances) of coordination” (Faraj and Xiao, 
2006, p. 1156).  
In this paper, we seek to extend this approach by studying how coordination unfolds in the 
context of temporary, complex, and rapidly changing operations (what) across various phases 
of work (when). This longitudinal approach is useful in examining both perspectives on 
coordination (as design and as practice). It emphasises coordinating as a time-dependent 
process, rather than coordination as a state and, hence something that should be examined over 
time. Important aspects of design such as specialization, standardization, and rationalization 
take time to conceive and implement. In the same vein, ‘practice’ by its very nature extends 
over time and is only revealed as participants seek to coordinate activities in a temporal 
sequence in relation to unfolding external demands and constraints. The next section provides 
relevant literature on TOs, focusing on their coordination challenges. 
 
3. Coordination challenges in temporary organizations 
TOs present particular coordination challenges. Firstly, being seen as ephemeral and unstable, 
they tend to lack formal structures that facilitate coordination and control (Meyerson et al., 
1995). Secondly, because the workforce is often employed temporarily, staff may not become 
familiar with the context specificities and with each other; they need to work interdependently 
based on ‘swift trust’ (Meyerson et al., 1995). Thirdly, these organizations often face 
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conditions of high uncertainty, complexity, time constraint, and fast decision-making, where 
mistakes can sometimes be catastrophic (Bechky, 2006). Finally, in project-based 
organizations there might be a tension between the autonomy requirements of participants in 
particular projects and their functional embeddedness within the more enduring organizational 
settings. This may demand embedding of informal activities within the organization’s formal 
coordination routines (Sydow et al., 2004). 
Operational coordination in TOs tends to be understood as being based primarily on 
informal and interpersonal mechanisms, in contrast with the formal mechanisms that are 
predominant in permanent organizations (e.g. Hanisch and Wald, 2014; Bechky, 2006). More 
specifically, although Project Management standards and techniques have been introduced for 
coordination in some TOs, these substitutes for formal structures and processes are not always 
effective. Therefore, coordination tends to be characterized by high degrees of communication 
and mutual adjustment (Hanisch and Wald, 2014). In film sets, Bechky (2006, p. 17) develops 
the notion of role-based coordination, in which “coordination takes place in a negotiated order 
created through role enactments”. She suggests that TOs tend to rely on interpersonal processes 
rather than on formal structures, due to high levels of task and environmental uncertainty. 
Similarly, Majchrzak et al. (2007) explore coordination in a disaster relief context. They point 
out that when disasters strike, formal structures and planned responses are “too slow, 
disconnected, and inadequate for the task”, and emergent, action-based group responses are 
necessary to achieve coordination (Majchrzak et al., 2007, p. 147).  
These views of coordination through emergent processes are largely regarded as 
contradictory and incompatible with coordination through stable structural arrangements 
(Bechky, 2006; Pauget and Wald, 2013). Furthermore, although some scholars address 
coordination problems in specific temporary contexts such as disaster relief operations, 
projects, and film sets (e.g. Bechky, 2006; Bechky and Chung, 2017; Hanisch and Wald, 2014; 
Majchrzak et al., 2007), these constitute a rather limited range of settings, and tend to 
concentrate mostly on the temporary aspect. Further research on coordination challenges in 
TOs, considering varying degrees of temporary and enduring elements, is necessary to draw 
more general conclusions on how coordination takes place. We address this by examining the 





We have conducted an immersive case study (Barratt et al., 2011) using interviews, participant 
observation, and longitudinal fieldwork over a substantive portion of the time during which the 
temporary organization operated. This allowed the investigation of operational coordination in 
real time as it evolved in its natural setting, taking into account important contextual aspects 
(Meredith, 1998). In TOs, particularly, longitudinal research designs are powerful ways to 
investigate complex organizational phenomena over time (Bakker, 2010; Bechky, 2006).  
 
4.1 Case selection 
We have chosen a theoretically exemplar case (Eisenhardt, 1989) of TO: the 2016 Olympic 
Games Organizing Committee (OGOC). The Committee was established especially to organize 
the 2016 Olympic and Paralympic Games and was then disbanded. This is an interesting 
context because it combines great regularity across Games (allowing a certain amount of 
predictability and some enduring elements) with its uniqueness to each host city (bringing high 
levels of novelty, uncertainty, and emergent temporary elements). For instance, at the local 
level, the Organizing Committees are always temporary. However, they are not simply 
temporary structures; they also present varying degrees of both temporary (e.g. provisional 
structures and short-term contracts) and enduring elements (e.g. standardized processes defined 
by the International Olympic Committee – IOC). 
We selected one area of operations of the OGOC: the transport operation, which involved 
the transport of more than 50,000 Games clients such as athletes, dignitaries, National Olympic 
Committees and IOC members, and media. This operation was selected for three main reasons. 
First, the focus on one area of Committee operations was necessary to achieve an in-depth 
study, in spite of our necessarily finite research resources. Second, both academic and practice-
based sources emphasize how important and challenging the transport operation is at mega-
events. It is delivered by a temporary, massive operational system with extreme complexity, 
related to the transient nature of the event and to the host cities, which usually have significant 
urban ‘base load’ travel and congested transport systems (Currie and Shalaby, 2012; Minis and 
Tsamboulas, 2008). Third, given the decentralized nature of the transport operation, 
coordinated activity among different teams was essential, making this a fruitful empirical 
setting in which to explore our research question. 
 
4.2 Data collection 
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The first author was a full-time volunteer at the Olympics from July to September 2016, and 
conducted the fieldwork. Data collection involved semi-structured interviews, participant 
observation, and internal documents. Since our interest was in firm-level coordination, people 
from the OGOC were interviewed. Through ‘snowballing’, the initial interviewees enabled 
access to further respondents. Besides staff within the Transport department, people in other, 
directly related departments (e.g. Security, Procurement, and Information Technology) were 
intentionally selected (Miles et al., 2014). We aimed for diversity: interviewees were from 
various hierarchy levels, responsible for different transport services, and based in multiple 
Olympic venues. Some had previous experience in mega-events, such as the World Cup and 
the Pan-American Games. The interviewees’ profile is detailed in Appendix 1. In total, 28 
interviews were conducted, corresponding to 25.5 hours of recording altogether. The questions 
focused on understanding the transport operation and its related services, on the evolution of 
the Committee over time, and on the main coordination challenges and strategies. Most of the 
interviews were carried out in person and a few by Skype, depending on the interviewees’ 
availability. All interviews were recorded and transcribed.  
Another key source of data was participant observation, which enabled an insider 
perspective and complete contextual embeddedness (Tracy, 2013). The first author’s activities 
as volunteer involved working within the transport team in the Barra Olympic Park, where 
most of the competitions took place. This entailed duties such as controlling access, managing 
timetables, giving information, and allocating cars to clients. This enabled observation of 
ground-level coordination, decision-making regarding operational issues, on-the-spot training, 
and management of unforeseen situations. The main participants involved were middle-level 
managers, operational staff, and volunteers. Rich information and perceptions were collected 
during the working hours and more informally (e.g., during lunchtime). Additional data were 
collected in documents such as reports, maps, manuals, daily schedules, and operational plans. 
These documents described operational procedures developed by the OGOC based on the 
IOC’s manuals and guidelines.  
 
4.3 Data analysis 
Data analysis was done in three steps: data reduction, data coding, and longitudinal analysis. 
Miles et al. (2014) recommendations on data coding and reduction in combination with 
temporal bracketing strategy were adopted. The temporal bracketing strategy allowed 
structuring the description of events in successive time periods. Specifically, this strategy 
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“permits the constitution of comparative units of analysis for the exploration and replication of 
theoretical ideas” (Langley, 1999, p. 703). During the data reduction phase, all sources of 
information (interview transcripts, documents, and field notes) were combined and 
summarized, focusing on coordination. The second step consisted of the coding process, which 
allowed the identification of the main challenges and aspects of coordination, based on the 
literature and on the empirical data. Table 1 presents the final codes, including their definition 
and representative quotes. Finally, through the temporal bracketing strategy, the operations in 
each of the Olympic phases were broken down and analysed in detail in order to understand 
their characteristics and coordination strategies.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
5. Findings 
We present the findings in four sub-sections. First, we describe the activities of the transport 
operation and identify some ways in which they differ from those of the previous edition of the 
Games. We then describe the four phases into which IOC’s manuals and procedures divide 
each Olympic Games. Then, we present the coordination challenges and related strategies 
adopted. Finally, we explore how formal and informal coordination mechanisms were 
combined over time. 
 
5.1 The Transport Operation 
From August 5th to August 21st, more than 11,300 athletes from 207 countries competed for 
306 sets of medals, in 45 Olympic venues in Rio de Janeiro. The transport operation is essential 
to this, and one of the most complex in the Olympic Games. This is because it is large, multi-
dimensional and has to be adapted to the local environment. Furthermore, the continually 
changing pattern of events on different days requires changing transport provision. The 
transport operation for all Olympic Games is mostly based on the IOC’s transportation manual, 
which requires transport planners to develop solutions to meet the demands of the Games and 
of the host city, taking into account previous Games experiences and best practices.   
 The manual provides general policies and information on clients’ profile and related 
services, requirements on transport infrastructure and facilities, rules related to security and 
access, transport support services, and traffic management system, to name a few. It also 
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defines distinct transport systems such as TA – transport of athletes, TF – transport of 
federations, and TM – transport of media, and the deliverables associated with each. For 
example, while dignitaries would usually have a dedicated car and driver to take them to the 
Olympic venues, media clients would need to check timetables and see which coaches could 
best meet their needs.  
The OGOC used two types of transport, coaches and vehicles (cars and vans), to deliver 
dedicated and shared transport services. In Rio, around 4,600 vehicles were provided by Nissan 
(one of the official sponsors) and 850 coaches were provided by a bus consortium comprising 
32 small and medium-sized local firms. The transport team planned more than 7,000 routes to 
provide the required services. The workforce consisted mainly of volunteers. Operations were 
carried out by a combination of centralized teams responsible for more general activities, such 
as vehicle maintenance and cleaning, and venue-specific teams in charge of delivering the 
transport services, including access control, transport within the venues, and parking. Some 
standardized elements were very important to enable this operation. For example, all Games 
clients and staff had an Olympic Identity and Accreditation Card (OIAC), indicating name, 
organization, country, type of access, etc. and, importantly for the transport operations, the type 
of the transport system he/she could use (e.g., TA, TF, and TM). All accredited vehicles had a 
particular Venue Access/Parking Permit (VAPP). This accreditation was a combination of 
letters and symbols that identified (1) which type of client was being transported (e.g., athletes, 
dignitaries, or media); (2) the type of access of a specific vehicle (all venues, specific venues 
only, outside the venues only, etc.); and (3) if the vehicle had a dedicated parking space.  
The IOC’s guidelines and rules are common to all Organizing Committees: they were used 
for the 2012 London Olympics and the 2016 Rio Olympics, and will support the 2020 Tokyo 
Olympics.  However, the manual is clear on the need to adapt the transport operation to the 
host cities’ specificities. Both London and Rio had had experience of planning and delivering 
several mega-events every year, such as marathons, Carnival, and New Year’s Eve 
celebrations, meaning that there were existing operational plans from which they could build: 
these had similarities, but also differences. Other specificities arose from the details of the 
venues and the maturity of infrastructure. First, while in London there were 34 relatively 
concentrated venues, in Rio there were 45 Olympic venues distributed in four different regions 
of the city. For example, in London, the Olympic Village was next to the Olympic Park and 
athletes could walk to several competition venues. In Rio, although both venues were in the 
same region, they were farther apart, and athletes needed to make a 10-minute bus journey 
from the Olympic Village to the Olympic Park. To travel between different regions of the city 
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could take more than 90 minutes. Second, whereas the London Organizing Committee could 
benefit from the extensive transport network and infrastructure available, in Rio, a new 
transport network was created. For example, roads and tunnels were built, a new metro line 
and several bus lines were developed (especially, BRT – Bus Rapid Transit), and a Light Rail 
Vehicle (LVR) system was created. Third, in Rio, the routes were planned so as to avoid some 
areas of the city because of security concerns. These aspects did not affect the transport 
operation in the 2012 London Olympics.  
 
5.2 The Olympic Phases 
The Games were organized across distinct phases: planning, venueization, operation, and 
dissolution. These are described in IOC’s manuals and procedures, and differ in terms of 
operations, activities, and challenges. What follows is a brief description of them. 
The planning phase lasted from 2009 to 2016. During the early years, the OGOC was a 
small organization; there were around 50 paid staff in 2009 and 80 in 2010. The Committee 
increased in size and scope gradually during the subsequent years (Figure 1). During this phase, 
there were few people from third parties. In subsequent phases, many organizations and 
individuals joined the operations (e.g., volunteers, public bodies, and service providers). 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Venueization refers to the period immediately before the Games, which started around five 
months before the opening ceremony. Plans made during the planning phase were activated, 
translating the unified and centralized structure of the OGOC into individual and decentralized 
operational units (venues). In this phase, many people were hired to prepare the venues, making 
the OGOC expand exponentially (from around 2,500 paid staff in 2015 to 6,500 in 2016). The 
following quote from the former CFO of the London Organizing Committee indicates the 
complexity involved: 
“There were multiple challenges, but I think overall delivering a hugely complex 
event at the same time as building an organization from a small family company to 
a FTSE 100. For me, those would be the two big macro challenges along with 
trying to deliver it on budget” (Neil Wood, former CFO of London Organizing 
Committee for the Olympic Games – BBC Radio 4 talk). 
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The operation phase refers to the period in which everything planned and structured in the 
previous two phases needed to actually work. It includes Games-time, but the exact start of this 
phase varied according to the activities involved. For the transport team, it began in July 2016 
and finished in September 2016. Finally, the dissolution phase is the ‘disassembly’ of the 
organizational structure (workforce, infrastructure, contracts, technology, and the organization 
as a whole). This phase lasted until the end of 2016, when the OGOC as an organization came 
to an end; i.e., legal, material, and financial dissolution.  
 
5.3 Coordination in the Olympic phases 
Our analysis shows that each phase (1) had distinct conditions that created challenges and (2) 
utilised both formal and informal coordination mechanisms in varying degrees to address the 
challenges. These are defined and their illustrative quotes from our data coding are presented 
in Table 1. In this section we first provide a summary of our findings (Table 2) and then explain 
them in detail. Specifically, we observed that each phase was characterized by high or low 
levels of the three coordination challenges of uncertainty, interdependence, and  time pressure 
which in turn influenced the adoption of distinct coordination structures and mechanisms.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
 5.3.1 Planning phase  
The planning process was mostly based on the IOC’s transportation manual, which contains 
guidelines, requirements, and transportation services that need to be provided during the 
Games. Besides the manual (which is a legacy from other Organizing Committees), the IOC 
also organizes a formal process of knowledge transfer, which includes meetings and visits. 
Staff from the OGOC visited many venues during the London 2012 Olympic Games, observing 
and learning from diverse operations. This also happened in Brazil: during the Games, many 
observers from Tokyo 2020 Organizing Committee visited the venues and departments. The 
interviewees recognized that the planning of the transport operation drew on the formal 
experience from other committees, but they also stressed Brazilian economic, political, and 
cultural specificities, which demanded many adjustments and different strategies.  To illustrate 
this point one of the interviewees compared London and Rio de Janeiro. “The lessons learned 
in one country may not be useful for another country. What worked in London will not 
necessarily work in Rio” (Christine – Transport General Manager). 
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This phase exhibited high levels of uncertainty, which increased the complexity of the 
planning process. Although some people from the OGOC had previous experience in the 
organization of mega-events, for most of them, it was the first time. They did not know exactly 
what was going to happen, how they would operate, and with whom they would be working. 
Work in this phase involved low levels of interdependence. Overall, the activities developed 
by the transport team did not involve many third parties. This included planning (of routes, 
material, workforce, and infrastructure), supplier development, procurement, rehearsal, and 
development of IT solutions. In the late phases of the planning phase, the interdependence 
increased, as public and private organizations joined the OGOC. Compared to the following 
phases, time pressure was relatively low. The interviewees agreed that they had enough time 
to plan the operation properly, milestones were well defined, and deliveries were monitored by 
the IOC. 
The transport team used a centralized coordination structure, whereby activities and 
requirements were specified in procedures, handbooks, and previous Committees’ reports. 
Planning was mostly based on these documents, on formal meetings with the clients, and on 
the formal process of knowledge transfer organized by the IOC. Within the OGOC, weekly 
meetings were conducted involving different departments in the early phases of the planning 
and later on involving suppliers, providers, and public bodies. In this phase, formal 
coordination mechanisms were preponderant. 
 
 5.3.2 Venueization phase  
For venueization, staff and volunteers were allocated in groups to each venue. The operations 
included logistics, assembly of temporary structures (e.g., tents, garages, parking spaces), and 
training. This phase started in March 2016; many interviewees felt this was too late. The time 
pressure to finish everything before the Games increased the need for coordinated activity.  
In each venue, people from public and private organizations and new OGOC staff joined 
the operation, meaning that most people working in the venues had not participated in the 
planning phase. They had to understand the processes and at the same time identify ways of 
improving them and training people accordingly. Therefore, a great challenge was the 
integration of interdependent tasks. Furthermore, the need for new processes and resources that 
had not been anticipated emerged, which increased the levels of uncertainty. In this phase, the 
nature of operations changed significantly: there was an increase in decentralization, number 




The venueization phase imposed a decentralized coordination structure translated across 
functional areas in all venues. Tests in this phase led to many changes; new requirements 
emerged according to which some operational plans were redesigned, and schedules were 
updated. Formal meetings became less frequent and communication with people in different 
places was enabled by technology (e.g., e-mail, radios, and mobile phones). In this phase, some 
informal coordination mechanisms emerged. These included alternate processes due to local 
requirements at specific venues, new ways of organizing the work, and informal ways of 
communicating (e.g. via WhatsApp – a free instant messaging application on smartphones). 
For example, a specific group with the transport team members responsible for different athlete 
delegations was created on WhatsApp to facilitate information sharing, decision-making, and 
problem-solving in the venues. Additionally, face-to-face interactions between teams in the 
same venue intensified. In sum, the organization used a combination of the formal coordination 
mechanisms that had been preponderant in the planning phase (e.g. plans and schedules) and 
informal coordination mechanisms that emerged to overcome coordination challenges (e.g. 
informal communication) as the planned processes were initiated.   
 
  5.3.3 Operation phase  
During the operation phase, the OGOC required its members to coordinate complex and 
interdependent activities under severe time pressure across diverse decentralized operational 
units. The massive increase in number and diversity of people and activities accentuated 
coordination challenges. Thousands of people (employees of OGOC and other public and 
private organizations, and volunteers) needed to work interdependently and in synchronization 
in order to deliver different transport services. These people had different training levels, which 
made it difficult to coordinate certain activities, including completely new ones such as fleet 
management, on-site training, and venue management. In addition, people were working under 
extreme time pressure (e.g., delays could cause an athlete to miss a competition).  
High levels of uncertainty challenged coordination during Games-time. There were around 
50,000 clients to be transported across 45 venues, based in four different regions of the city. 
Moreover, 40 events happened simultaneously and the transport team could not always predict 
the number and profile of people who would go to each competition. This emphasized the need 
for ‘inter-venue’ coordination. In the venueization phase, coordination was necessary within 
the venues (internal focus), where different OGOC teams had to interact and develop 
interdependent activities. In the operation phase, coordination was additionally needed within 
and between venues (internal and external focus). Since the transport services were delivered 
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to and from the venues’ boundaries, teams from a specific venue had to be aligned with teams 
from other venues. 
Through a decentralized structure, coordination was enabled largely by intensive interaction 
between people on the ground and by emergent informal mechanisms. Interaction was 
facilitated by radios, organizational systems, and open apps. Formal plans and rules were 
treated as overarching principles rather than strictly normative procedures. The start of the 
operation posed difficulties because some process details had not been completely structured, 
mainly due to time constraint. This gave rise to some ‘grey areas’: emergent situations could 
only be identified during operation, and it was therefore difficult to allocate responsibility for 
them in advance. In this context, staff from the OGOC typically acted as the main coordinators. 
If people from a third-party organization could not solve a problem themselves, instead of 
calling their managers, they turned to members from the Committee to resolve it. Thus, social 
roles and interactions seemed to be more important than hierarchical relations and procedures.  
Staff always needed to make prompt decisions in dealing with clients. An example is how 
the transport team solved the problem of an unexpectedly high demand in the venue level. They 
had not foreseen that so many clients would go from a specific venue (Maracanã) to multiple 
dispersed hotels in the same region (Copacabana). Thus, they had not planned this route for the 
required number of people. The problem was solved by taking the clients to central areas of 
Copacabana by buses and then, from these central points, cars took them to their hotels. This 
decision had to be made very quickly and required a coordinated set of activities because when 
people got to these central points, cars needed to be waiting for them.  
In some cases, people on the ground could not check with their managers before 
accommodating unforeseen demands and would, instead, make a decision and then report what 
had been done. For example, one volunteer taking care of a principal access control point had 
to decide whether or not to allow a truck of food supplies into the Olympic Park at a time when 
deliveries were not normally allowed. Knowing that food supplies were lacking and that his 
decision would help to resolve this, the volunteer allowed the truck in, aware that he was 
breaking the rules by not checking with his manager. He then reported the situation to the 
manager, who congratulated him. “If the transport operation did not require people to judge 
this kind of situation, it would be easy; we could use tags, RFID (Radio-Frequency 
Identification), and automatic check points to control access. However, we need people’s 
knowledge and judgement to handle this kind of situation, especially in a context of time 
pressure and uncertainty. In the Olympics, we deal with uncertainty and urgency all the time. 
Therefore, not everything will follow the rules” (David – Transport Manager).  
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More generally, data collected through observation showed that even if the Committee had 
had several more years to plan, they could still not have anticipated all eventualities because 
some issues and solutions emerged only during Games-time. Overall, in the operation, 
procedures had to be redefined and adjusted in an ongoing manner, as new ways of performing 
activities were incorporated.  
 
  5.3.4 Dissolution phase  
The dissolution phase was characterized by a systemic approach – the organization as a whole 
should end. Activities included return of temporary structures (e.g., garages, tents, security 
grids), conclusion of short-life contracts with people and companies, return of the cars to 
Nissan, and return of the coaches to the bus consortium. The transport team also had to deal 
with the aftermath (e.g., traffic fines, insurance issues, and accidents). The main challenge was 
time pressure because all temporary structures, such as parking spaces, had strict deadlines and 
expensive fines in the event of delays. Besides that, the temporary contracts of employees were 
coming to an end. 
During this phase, most of the local teams disbanded and staff returned to the centralized 
structure in the main office. Since the dissolution plan had been fully predefined, formal 
mechanisms such as plans, contracts, and schedules played a fundamental role to enable 
coordinated activity. For example, activities were formalized through procedures and 
schedules, and contracts were designed considering the temporary nature of the operation (e.g., 
disposal, rental, selling, donation, and disassembly).  
 
5.4 Formal and informal coordination 
Varying degrees of uncertainty, interdependence, and  time pressure in each phase influenced 
the coordination mechanisms used. We illustrate this in Figure 2 by showing the relationship 
between varying degrees of interdependence and the extent to which formal and informal 
mechanisms were used. The X axis represents the centralized/decentralized nature of the 
operations of the Olympic phases over time. The Y axis denotes the level of interdependence 
within the Committee and is assessed by the approximate number of the OGOC paid staff over 
the years. The development of the histogram was based on the number of codes related to 
formal and informal coordination mechanisms, taking into account data collected through 




[Insert Figure 2 here]  
 
The histogram shows how coordination challenges (in our example, interdependence) 
influenced the use of varying degrees of formal and informal coordination mechanisms in 
different Olympic phases. We can note that interdependence changed over time, as did the use 
of informal mechanisms. In the planning phase (from 2009 to March 2016), there were 
centralized operations and low levels of interdependence; the transport staff could develop 
activities without extensive interaction and help from other departments. Activities were 
supported mostly by formal mechanisms such as plans and procedures. In the venueization 
(from March to July 2016), there were increasing levels of interdependence between functional 
areas. Teams that were previously working separately depended on each other to develop their 
individual activities and needed to work cooperatively to prepare the venues for operation. 
Informal structures, routines, and communication tools emerged and were used alongside 
formal plans and procedures.  
In the operation phase (from July to September 2016), the levels of interdependence were 
the highest, resulting from the increase of people, organizations, and operations and from the 
need for real-time responsiveness. Thousands of people from different departments of the 
OGOC and from other organizations had to develop interdependent activities jointly and in 
synchronisation during Games-time. Informal coordination mechanisms such as informal 
communication and intensive interaction were preponderant and served as an alternative to 
formal plans that did not work or were not sufficient to handle new demands and the 
decentralized nature of the operations. Finally, in the dissolution phase (from September to 
December 2016), operations were centralized and the interdependence was low; i.e. individual 
teams developed their specific activities in order to complete the dissolution plan. Coordination 
relied mostly on formal mechanisms such as contracts and schedules.  
This illustrates that formal and informal coordination mechanisms are complementary and 
can be combined over time in order to develop decentralized and temporary processes. Further, 
our analysis suggests a contingency logic in using these mechanisms determined by the 
presence of varying degrees of coordination challenges (uncertainty, interdependence, and time 
pressure). The following section further discusses our findings. 
 
6. Discussion and research contributions 
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How does operational coordination take place through the various phases of work in 
temporary organizations? Our findings suggest that operational coordination in temporary 
organizations dealing with multiple and decentralized operations takes place through both the 
implementation of formal and emergence of informal coordination mechanisms, which vary 
relatively according to the phases of the work. To reflect on these findings and stress our 
contributions, we first discuss ‘hybridity’ in TOs, meaning that they comprise elements that 
are enduring as well as temporary and centralized as well as decentralized. This brings unique 
challenges to coordination. Secondly, we explore ‘venueization’, a strategy developed by the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) to link planning and operation phases. It is a phase in 
which central structures are translated to operational units, taking account of local specificities.  
Thirdly, we suggest that, since TOs present different activities and related coordination 
challenges across various phases of work, the coordination is contingent on the phase of the 
project. This includes central implementation of formal as well as local emergence of informal 
coordination mechanisms, in varying degrees over time.  
 
6.1 Hybridity in temporary organizations 
Contrary to some views that TOs lack formal and enduring structures due to their limited 
duration (e.g. Meyerson et al., 1995), we empirically show that TOs dealing with multiple and 
decentralized operations are hybrid organizational forms; i.e., they have enduring as well as 
temporary and centralized as well as decentralized elements. On the one hand, in the Olympics 
there were multiple enduring and centralized organizational structures, standards, processes, 
and relationships. Typical examples are enduring partnerships, guidelines, and formal 
knowledge transfer processes developed by the IOC in order to maintain continuity and 
standards across all the Olympic Games. On the other hand, there were finite-life and 
decentralized organizational structures, processes, and work teams created only to fulfil 
specific tasks. The OGOC is an example of this hybridity: it has features of enduring 
bureaucratic organizations such as departments, procedures, and hierarchy relations; yet it also 
presents dynamism in the form of temporary elements similar to an organic organization (Burns 
and Stalker, 1966) changing over time to accomplish specific phases. This hybrid nature has 
important implications for coordination because the requirements in each type of organization 




Another example of hybridity was the presence of high-level centralized and local-level 
decentralized structural elements and processes. Given the hierarchical structure of the 
transport team, the planning was centralized and conducted by people in higher positions 
(director, general managers, and regional managers) and the execution was decentralized and 
implemented by people in middle/low positions (venue managers, supervisors, analysts, and 
volunteers). On the one hand, both high-level activities and deliverables (transportation 
services) did not change from one venue to the next. All venues had to be prepared to provide 
all transport services related to the pre-defined transport systems and related clients. For this, 
there were centralized and overarching process guidelines and standards related to security and 
access control, waiting times, signage, and accidents, to name a few. These were centralized 
and enduring elements applied to all venues. On the other hand, the way the services were 
provided changed. Although all venues had overarching process guidelines, activities had to 
be adapted at the local level to accommodate venue specificities and unforeseen demands, 
giving rise to localized elements. Some examples were the Olympic Park, the Olympic Village, 
and one of the garages as we explain below.  
Since there were diverse competition venues within the Olympic Park, transport services 
had to be adapted. For example: (1) higher frequency of services given the high demand; (2) 
multiple entries and load zones to take care of different clients and sports requirements within 
the Park; (3) specific parking spaces considering particular transport systems (TA, TF, and 
TM); and (4) several checkpoints and increased signage to deal with the complexity of the 
traffic in the Park. In contrast, the transport operation and related services in the golf course 
were much simpler. Further venue-specific requirements were observed in the Olympic 
Village. Given the size of the athletes’ accommodation venue, specific internal transport 
services were necessary. For example, a ‘circular service’ was added, which went around the 
Village during the whole day so that the athletes could easily reach different points (e.g., 
restaurants, transport mall, leisure areas, and social events). This service was not available in 
any other venue. Finally, in the garage located near the Galeão International Airport, even 
though radio had been defined centrally as the standard channel of communication and 
information sharing, alternative methods of communication were adopted by staff and 
volunteers because the airport activities disrupted the radio signals. 
Our data suggests that the use of localized elements in combination with centralized ones in 
the venues were defined at different organizational levels in planned and emergent ways, which 
then required coordination efforts. It seems that more unforeseen and venue-specific 
adaptations led to the adoption of more emergent elements. Venues varied in the extent to 
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which they adopted the overarching central plan as opposed to adapting to (foreseen and 
unforeseen) local requirements, at different hierarchical levels.  We suggest that this difference 
between venues could be captured in a measure of hybridity1, which could be useful in practice 
as a way to characterise venues, in the specific context of the Olympics, as well as more 
generally. Examples of variations at different hierarchical levels in the Olympics are as follows: 
high-level variations (Director) – all transport services required by the IOC should be provided 
taking into account the host city’s specificities (e.g., unsafe areas of Rio had to be avoided in 
the overall operation); middle-level variations (Venue Manager) – each individual venue 
should be able to operate given individual particularities (e.g., several operational adaptations 
had to be undertaken in the Olympic Park given its complexity in terms of size and diversity 
of competitions); low-level variations (staff and volunteers) – operational workforce should be 
able to operate under time pressure and respond to local contingencies (e.g., operational 
adjustments had to be undertaken on the ground in diverse venues). Characterising venues 
different levels of variations throughout the hierarchy as well as the recognition of hybridity 
(presence of temporary vs. enduring and centralized vs. decentralized elements) as captured in 
a measure of hybridity, could inform the choice of specific managers for different venues based 
on their management style or experience, or other operational decisions such as prioritising 
some venues for early venueization. 
Although the presence of enduring elements in TOs has been acknowledged (e.g., Holguin-
Veras et al., 2012; Grabher, 2002), it has been a relatively underdeveloped theme, as most of 
the TO literature concentrates on more temporary and emergent aspects. By exploring the 
interplay between temporary and enduring elements over time, we have shown that not only 
do these elements exist simultaneously, but also that they change to meet requirements of 
specific phases of work in TOs. The Olympics was a rich empirical setting to understand these 
dynamics. Based on our findings, we suggest that TOs dealing with multiple and decentralized 
operations are inherently hybrid as they comprise enduring as well as temporary, and 
centralized as well as decentralized elements. Furthermore, we argue that since TOs usually 
have multiple phases, including planning and operation, hybrid elements change across 
different phases of the work. While in the planning, there are more enduring and centralized 
structural elements and processes, in the operation there are more temporary and decentralized 
ones. These findings are summarized in the following propositions: 
                                                          
1 We thank the Guest Editors for suggesting this. 
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Proposition 1: Temporary organizations developing multiple and decentralized 
operations will require a hybrid mix of elements (temporary vs. enduring and 
centralized vs. decentralized), which changes over time to accomplish requirements of 
different phases of the work. 
Proposition 2: Planning phases of work will require more enduring and centralized 
elements and operation phases will require more temporary and decentralized ones. 
How do we link these elements and phases? Based on the empirical setting investigated, we 
argue that venueization might be this linking mechanism. 
 
6.2 Venueization: transition phase in temporary organizations 
Venueization is the IOC’s formalized term for the transition phase in which Olympic venues 
are made ready to operate. Jacobsson et al. (2013) claim that the role of transition has been 
downplayed in the theory of TOs (Lundin and Söderholm, 1995), and argue that it should be 
given a more central place. In their approach, the temporary organization (in the form of 
internal projects) is a transitory unit within the permanent organization. This is a useful insight 
into the relationship between temporary internal projects and the permanent organization. We 
build on this to examine in depth how transitions take place in TOs, by exploring venueization. 
Venueization took the Organizing Committee from centralized planning to operation in 
multiple locations, and involved linking hybrid elements. It was primarily about applying 
centrally planned (already-adapted) structures to individual units, testing whether these really 
met local requirements, and further adapting them as needed. In order to do so, it often required 
redesign of operational plans, schedule updates, multi-divisional coordination, training, and 
management of intersections between centralized and decentralized elements. The OGOC had 
to undertake at least 45 different venueization processes, leading to high levels of complexity, 
as multiple projects happened simultaneously in a decentralized manner under strict time 
constraints. This involved high levels of face-to-face interactions among different work teams, 
learning from trial and error, and the emergence of informal structural elements. 
Our findings show that venueization was a necessary link between planning and operation. 
Although studies have focused on these phases individually, or examined knowledge transfer 
and learning between successive projects (e.g., Söderlund and Andersson, 1998), less attention 
has been given to the processes linking planning and operation.  In some contexts, however, 
they have been explored, using the concepts of tailoring and deployment. In concurrent 
engineering, tailoring refers to the customization of processes and structural elements to match 
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specific programme priorities and product characteristics (Swink, 1998). Tailoring in software 
development is defined as the adaptation of the method to the culture, objectives, environment 
and reality of the organization adopting it (Campanelli and Parreiras, 2015). It involves 
selecting or adapting software practices and can relate to stakeholders, project life cycle, project 
organization and knowledge building (Bass, 2016). Similarly, the deployment strategy involves 
replicating and adapting organizational elements (e.g., processes and teams) to a given 
situation. In the context of the Dutch Armed Forces for crisis response operations (Waard and 
Kramer, 2008), deployment involves a process of repetitively assembling tailor-made 
temporary units to develop a specific mission. In Project Management (PM), PM deployment 
includes the acceptance and adoption of the PM discipline by individuals and groups, which is 
influenced by cultural factors (Bredillet et al., 2010).  
Venueization is a particular form of tailoring and deployment, but with extreme 
characteristics due to rapid implementation among numerous, inexperienced and diverse staff 
and volunteers. This makes venueization distinctive in at least three ways. Firstly, in our 
particular setting, venueization was a messy and complex phase that involved joint work of 
diverse people and organizations aiming at multiple and overlapping objectives. Tailoring and 
deployment seem to be more straightforward approaches that have very specific objectives. 
Secondly, these approaches very often involve a team with enduring membership and common 
ground (Srikanth and Puranam, 2010) technically and organisationally – i.e., the deployment 
is usually from one set of professionals to another. Venueization in the Olympics involves 
implementation through a large number of recently recruited temporary staff and volunteers. 
This context is very extreme in that respect, which involves messiness, trial and error, and 
emergent elements. Our data showed that people executing the tasks were relatively unfamiliar 
with what they were doing. What is more, even the ones who participated in the planning phase 
had to test the specific plans, get them wrong, train people, learn, incorporate emergent 
elements, and adapt organizational arrangements, so that they could end up with a process that 
actually worked in a specific venue (scenario/context). Thirdly, while in a lot of projects the 
objective is to deliver an ‘end product’ once the prototypes have been trialled and adapted, in 
the Olympics, the process is what is delivered. Venueization is a key phase to design and adapt 
this process. However, the ‘end product’ of venueization is not a perfect ready-to-work process. 
Emergence and adaptation are core aspects for venueization and are also ongoing aspects that 
are part of the delivery of the ‘end product’ in the operation phase. 
In a general sense, venueization can be seen as a process for creating a local, venue-specific 
temporary mini-operation based on centralized principles, plans, processes and structures. A 
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venueization is successful when it results in an operational unit that, in the operational phase, 
can deliver the required service to satisfy objectives of quality, delivery and cost, and which is 
sufficiently flexible to cope with unexpected changes in demands or internal resources. Thus, 
a theoretical exposition of venueization should identify parameters that determine whether a 
venueization will be successful in these terms. Two parameters seem particularly important 
here: duration, and management and leadership. 
The first important parameter is duration. Most of the interviewees mentioned that they had 
a late venueization and because of that, they did not have enough time to implement, test, and 
adjust processes accordingly. This, in turn, led to many problems during Games-time, such as 
lack of necessary resources and people, conflicting information, and incompatible IT systems. 
As a result, staff had to be hired during the operation because there were not enough volunteers 
to fulfil all the operational needs, and informal IT applications were incorporated into the 
routines as people could not use the formal systems that had not been configured in time to 
support their processes. These led to additional costs and affected the delivery and quality of 
services. Venueization then, should be long enough to (1) apply, test, and adapt structures and 
processes, (2) train people properly, and (3) allow the emergence and incorporation of informal 
elements in a ‘safer’ (test) environment. Venueization affects subsequent coordination and, if 
successful, should result in an appropriate and effective combination of formal and informal 
coordination mechanisms. Informal mechanisms are an important source of flexibility, but a 
rushed venueization can result in over-dependence on untested informal mechanisms and 
consequent operational failures. However, venueization should not be too long because it is 
costly: the organization incurs labour and other costs during the venueization and, even with 
volunteers providing much of the labour in the Olympics, the volunteers themselves only had 
a limited capacity to give of their time.  
The second parameter is management and leadership. Data collected through observation 
showed that the skills and experience of key team members who had participated in the 
planning phase were important in transforming plans into operational units. In order to develop 
a successful venueization, it is necessary to have managers able to lead, motivate, and manage 
a diverse mix of people in order to capitalize on their abilities, and to support, promote, and 
encourage the incorporation of ideas and solutions in order to achieve operational outcomes. 
The venueization process is ultimately important to reduce uncertainty and to build 
organizational resilience: in other words, the ability to prepare for, identify, react to, and 
recover from unexpected situations maintaining continuity of operations. Based on these 
observations, the following propositions are developed:  
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Proposition 3: TOs developing decentralized and multiple operations will require a 
venueization process, in which central structures are translated to operational units or 
individual projects taking into account local specificities.  
Proposition 4: There is an inverse ‘U’ relationship between venueization duration and 
success in terms of subsequent operational performance (quality, delivery, flexibility, 
and costs).  
Proposition 5: Continuity of management and leadership between planning and 
venueization will lead to better performance in the operation phase. 
Proposition 6: Successful venueization will give rise to an appropriate combination of 
formal and informal coordination mechanisms in the operation phase. 
 
6.3 Combination of formal and informal mechanisms 
In the Olympics, the transport team needed to deal with competing demands imposed by 
different phases and by the dichotomy of managing individual and autonomous operational 
cells that were simultaneously also parts of a bigger organizational structure. The tension 
between being congruent with the IOC’s objectives and the OGOC’s hierarchical structure as 
well as being responsive and agile in delivering the required services and accommodating 
unforeseen demands, made coordination a big challenge. Despite the opportunity for planning 
formal and structured coordination mechanisms afforded by the relative predictability of the 
Olympics, informal and emergent elements were still very important. We evidenced how 
varying degrees of formal and informal mechanisms were combined throughout the Olympic 
phases to enable coordinated activity at the operational level.  
We propose that the hybrid nature of TOs, established earlier, also affects coordination. 
While scholars suggest that coordination in TOs relies primarily on informal and interpersonal 
mechanisms (e.g. Hanisch and Wald, 2014; Bechky, 2006; Pauget and Wald, 2013), we show 
that this is not always true. The simultaneous existence of formal and informal mechanisms to 
varying degrees means that coordination depends on the phase of the work and, more generally, 
has a contingent nature, being situated and driven by the requirement for accomplishing the 
final task. Our data showed that coordination mechanisms tend to be more formal and 
structured during the planning phase and that informal coordination mechanisms are 
predominant in the operation phase. The latter often result from innovative solutions from 
people ‘on the ground’.  
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However, even if the execution of specific processes might be adapted and improvised 
depending on the circumstances of a particular moment, the ability to do this was underpinned 
in various ways by standardisation. This may seem paradoxical (cf Browning, 2014), but the 
availability and widespread understanding of key process building-blocks, such as formal 
classification and identification of individuals and vehicles which determined their access 
rights and other privileges (e.g, TA – transport of athletes and TM – transport of media), made 
flexibility in delivery possible. The vast majority of staff were volunteers, who had joined the 
organization a few weeks earlier (at best) and received relatively little training. As such, these 
standard elements are particularly important, as they allow quick, flexible implementation 
under possibly volatile demand conditions, while preserving the quality of the process in terms 
of the key parameter of who is allowed which privilege. This could be understood from a 
modularity perspective as a use of ‘visible design rules’ (Baldwin and Clark, 2000) to facilitate 
the flexible combining and recombining of process elements, even when the amount of 
common ground between staff was relatively limited (Srikanth and Puranam, 2010). 
Our findings support the view that formal and informal mechanisms are complementary, 
rather than contradictory (Hanisch and Wald, 2014; Majchrzak et al., 2007).  However, while 
the literature suggests that informal mechanisms are the primary focus, we show that both types 
of mechanisms are equally required to enable coordination in TOs. Furthermore, we also 
examine how they are combined over time, and introduce a contingency logic to explain how 
formal mechanisms can be centrally implemented and informal mechanisms spontaneously 
emerge, as a result of varying coordination challenges in different phases of the work. In short, 
the traditional concept of operational coordination (Van de Ven et al., 1976) in TOs needs to 
consider contingency because of temporariness. Coordination in temporary settings has a 
contingent nature.  
The Committee’s size also influenced coordination. It expanded massively in terms of staff, 
volume of operations, and complexity; it started as a small organization and became a big 
company. In this process, we could identify the emergence of informal mechanisms while the 
organization was rapidly getting bigger. However, the current understanding of the relationship 
between coordination and size is that small organizations use improvisation first and when they 
get bigger usually turn to a standardized and bureaucratic structure. Here, we have the 
opportunity to rethink the contingency argument on size (Van de Ven et al., 1976). While it is 
broadly agreed that bigger companies favour formal coordination mechanisms, we found that 
a big organization developing decentralized operations in a temporary setting relies broadly on 
informal coordination mechanisms. Our results suggest that coordination mechanisms change 
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in response not only to changes in environmental conditions but also in response to changes in 
the organization itself. It was not simply a matter of designing coordination mechanisms in 
response to the environment. The decentralized nature of the organizational structure brought 
about emergent and informal coordination mechanisms. The following propositions reflect 
these insights: 
Proposition 7: As they grow, decentralized TOs will use increasingly informal 
coordination mechanisms. 
Proposition 8: Formal and informal coordination mechanisms will be used 
complementarily and contingently depending on the phase of work. 
Proposition 9: Increasing levels of time pressure – determined by non-negotiable 
deadlines – will increase the use of informal coordination mechanisms. 
Proposition 10: Increasing levels of temporary and decentralized operations will 
increase the use of informal coordination mechanisms. 
 
7. Conclusion: examining a ‘new’ context through an ‘old’ theory  
In investigating coordination in TOs, this paper examined a ‘new’ context, which is that of 
temporary organizations, through the ‘old’ Contingency Theory (e.g., Galbraith 1973; 
Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967; Van de Ven et al., 1976, Van de Ven et al., 
2013). Traditional theories on coordination focus on formal and informal coordination as 
contrasting alternative mechanisms and tend to portray trade-offs between them (Bechky, 
2006). However, TOs are diverse (Maylor, 2010; Meredith and Mantel, 2008) and can present 
different levels of variety, complexity, and uncertainty (Maylor et al., 2015, Ramasesh and 
Browning, 2014). Drawing from Contingency Theory as the sensitizing theoretical lens to 
consider these types of differences, we show that not only are formal and informal coordination 
mechanisms contingent on the phase of work in TOs, but also that they exist simultaneously 
and to varying extents. We have found a hybrid mix of elements; i.e., enduring as well as 
temporary and centralized as well as decentralized. What is more, this mix changes over time 
to take care of specific objectives of different phases. The same organization went through at 
least three different organizational structures over a relatively short period (from March to 
September 2016) because of the changing mix of elements. Our longitudinal research design 
was particularly relevant for these investigations. 
The OGOC increased in size, including a short period of rapid ramp-up (March to August 
2016) and, in the process, informal mechanisms emerged to support complex and high-volume 
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operations. This happened especially because of the decentralized and temporary nature of 
operations, and the period of rapid scaling-up. This suggests that, in TOs, there is a need for 
careful interpretation of the typical CT argument that coordination becomes more formal as 
organizations grow. Formal hierarchical coordination takes time to put in place and, if there is 
not time, or the incentive of a long-term organizational future, it may not be implemented. In 
other words, we argue that the causal mechanism between size and structure is not automatic 
or frictionless, and this is particularly apparent in TOs.  
Another interesting aspect relates to knowledge creation and learning in temporary settings. 
We have evidenced that lessons learned and successful practices from previous Organizing 
Committees were codified and documented into processes for future events especially in the 
form of the IOC Transportation Manual, feeding back into the central, enduring operation. 
However, several meetings as well as visits through the IOC’s Olympic Games Knowledge 
Management Programme were also necessary to transfer knowledge between Organizing 
Committees. Relating to coordination, we can argue that while some mechanisms can be 
codified, documented, and standardized to all Olympic Games (e.g., procedures on how to 
transport a dignitary), others are context-dependent and are not completely transferable (e.g., 
how to deal with traffic incidents during Games-time). In other words, observation, 
understanding, and ‘translation’ of practices (rather than replication) are necessary. Host cities 
are usually very different in terms of infrastructure, resource availability, and culture. By 
observing, people can learn what is being done, but it does not mean they are going to replicate 
it. It means that they are going to understand and absorb it, and then apply it to their context. 
The measure of hybridity we have previously proposed could be useful to understand the depth 
of penetration of centralized processes.  
Although we recognize that our findings are limited to the context in analysis, we believe 
that this paper provides a generalizable basis for future research to explore the dynamic nature 
of operational coordination in TOs and in rapidly changing contexts more broadly. Specifically, 
we believe that our findings in regard to (1) the hybrid nature of processes, (2) the contingent 
use of complementary coordination mechanisms over time and (3) the usefulness of the 
venueization phase might be generalizable to other temporary organizations dealing with 
multiple and decentralized operations. These conditions are true for many kinds of TOs such 
as disaster relief teams, theatre groups, and task forces. In all of these, there is usually a 
centralized structure that plans, strategizes, and organizes the work, and then there are 
decentralized structures to deliver.  
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This study has revealed factors that may influence the use of informal mechanisms: (1) how 
rigid and demanding the time constraints are, (2) how decentralized the operations are; (3) how 
rapidly the workforce scales up, and (4) how technically difficult and/or regulated the work is. 
We need to understand further these variables because in some temporary settings, where 
professionals are strongly guided by professional norms, techniques, and codes of practice, 
there might be limited scope for informal mechanisms. Future studies could examine 
coordination of TOs in different contexts in order to investigate if the patterns we observed in 
the Olympics can be transferred to other types of TOs. Another interesting research avenue is 
related to venueization. Future work could further investigate the factors determining the 
success of this phase, its impact on the operation phase, and in different contexts. Additionally, 
knowledge transfer and capability-building seem to play a fundamental role in translating 
planning to operation. These literatures could provide further understanding on venueization 
processes.  Finally, we have concentrated on the intra-organizational coordination issues, but 
are well aware that temporariness has implications for inter-organizational coordination as 
well. This provides another avenue for further research. 
Based on our findings, we hope that both scholars and practitioners can better recognise the 
challenges of managing in temporary organizational settings and developing intra-firm 
coordination strategies. They might also benefit from this study by understanding venueization 
and therefore better plan for and execute transition phases. 
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